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My brief reflection is based on two assumptions that might be controversial. The first 
assumption is about Pathosformel [pathos formula] and Sprachgebärde [language 
gesture], the two fundamental terms in Warburgs' art of viewing art, who first used the 
term in his 1906 writing on Dürer and the Italian antiquity (Warburg, "Dürer und die 
italiensche Antike") , and in André Jolles’ art of reading literature, developed mainly in 
his book on Einfache Formen from 1930. My first thesis is that these two terms can be 
compared and that they – phenomenologically taken – refer to the same concept. In 
further research this reflection might even be extended to Panofky's concept of "type" 
and to Ernst Robert Curtius' notion of "topos".
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 My second and main thesis is that this 
concept can be explained (and explored) by some of the recent theories developed in 
cognitive studies. In this sense I will simultaneously deal with Warburg and apply a 
Warburgian interest in joining insights from the so-called culture studies and the so -
called cognitive sciences, one of the leading and promising research areas in present 
times. 
The interesting point about Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde is that they seem to 
exist before concretization in the arts and even before their concrete meaning. 
Oscillating between a morphological preexistence and its meaningful appearance, their 
floating experience is a challenge both to history and eternity, to universalism and 
cultural relativism. Whenever one deals with Warburg's famous Mnemosyne-Atlas-
Project one can observe this challenge in action: The fact that the project is only 
bequeathed in vague drafts and ambiguous representations only highlights the 
permanent entanglement of its observer between "I do not really understand what it 
means" and "There is something about it".  
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 From the perspective of a methodological challenge a comparison of Pathosformel, Topos and Type has 




Intuitiveness as the anticipation of its meaning is what really delights our interest in 
Jolles and Warburg and their concepts of Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel. I will try to 
offer now some theoretical approaches from cognitive studies that might help us  
understand both: the terms of Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel, as well as our interest 
in them. 
The first concept that must be mentioned is of course the concept of schemas and 
scripts, which Ernst H. Gombrich referred to in his Art and Illusion even before the 
cognitive turn that we are suggesting (Ettlinger, 510). Schemas allow us to establish a 
meaningful contextual knowledge in a given situation, which means recognizing a 
single occurrence in its contextual relatedness. Schemas exist before the given 
experience and help us organize our perception, understanding and behavior. But 
schemas are grounded on experience as well, and are thus permanently modeled and 
changed. We count on schemas to make sense of the world, but we do not simply 
depend on them as an everlasting predestination. There can be several types of "schema 
management" (as Peter Stockwell put it): schemas can be restructured or preserved, they 
can be reinforced or completed, disrupted or refreshed (Stockwell, 80-81). But without 
them we hardly could make sense of what we perceive and experience. Some schemas 
even develop into, scripts which define a sequence of expected behaviors for a certain 
situation. Entering a coffee shop we immediately know how to act (looking for a table, 
sitting down, asking for a coffee, paying and leaving again), though coffees and waiters 
and chairs and bills may be different from case to case. Those who have experienced the 
Lisbon Café Brasileira, a Wiener Kaffeehaus and an American Starbucks know that 
scripts have a very limited validity – so that we sometimes leave the coffee shop quite 
disappointed by the coffee, the waiter, the chair or the bill.  
Art and literature widely build upon schemas and scripts – and so does our 
recognition of Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde. Recent findings concerning mirror 
neurons might even help explain how we develop our schemas and scripts by mirroring 
each other’s mind. The so-called "theory of mind", i.e. understanding others as 
intentional beings, with a mental existence much akin to our own, depends highly on the 
assumption of scripts and schemas, which allow us to theorize in an outreaching 
complex manner, as in the following sentence: "Of course I care about how you 
imagined I thought you perceived I wanted you to feel." (Zunshine, 30). 
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Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel would be the impetus of scripts and schemas 
unfolding as a shared and contextual meaning. As such they would be simultaneously 
stable and dynamic, universal as a principle and historical in their unfolding. This first 
cognitive description could be a step forward in the analysis of their sophisticated and 
manifold experience in art.
2
 There are still many doubts concerning theory of mind, 
mirror neurons and the perceptional and behavioral importance of schemas and scripts. 
But these doubts are no stronger than the effort to explain the mindful workings of the 
brain both as a common and an extraordinary experience. 
A second theory from cognitive studies might suggest a further insight. Without 
contradiction to the former proposal, we might try to consider Sprachgebärde and 
Pathosformel as a way of conceptual integration, the so-called blending or "mental 
binding", first developed by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier in their book The Way 
We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. The theory has 
been widely applied to the analysis of metaphor, but – as the title of the book suggests – 
its scope is much broader. In our interpretation the Pathosformel would work like a 
"presentation space" which is blended with the (representation of the) referent in a way 
that generates meaning. Again we could count on a certain stability, continuity and 
recognition on the one hand, as we could experience on the other hand singularity and 
innovation. Following a later development of conceptual blending we could imagine a 
relevance space working in the process itself, once again like an orientation towards 
restructuring, preservation, reinforcement, refinement, disruption or refreshment. 
Observing the concrete case of Dürer's "Tod des Orpheus" we might understand how 
the antique tradition and the modern vision worked together in Dürer's art. By joining 
the two attributes given by Warburg himself to the Pathosformel ("lebenskräftig"; full 
of life) and to Dürer's own position in painting ("bodenständig"; down-to-earth) we 
acknowledge the process of conceptual integration as a concrete moment in history: 
Pathosformel and Dürer's own position merge in the reinforced blend that gives rise to 
what we call the Renaissance. The blend would be what Warburg himself called the 
Einverseelung, (Warburg, "Mnemosyne”, 3), a mental assimilation (figure 1). 
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 Neuroaesthetics is the new discipline linking the long tradition of empathy in art theory to the 
observation of cognitive processes as in the case of mirror neurons. Such discussion must necessarely 
refer to Warburg's Pathosformel, as do David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese in "Motion, Emotion and 





















To understand the same procedure for the term Sprachgebärde, one can observe in 
figure 2 how the life and death of Mr. X is transformed through the presentation as a 
Sprachgebärde of virtue and wonder. The resulting blend gives rise to the meaning of 
the legend of a saint.  


















In both cases the conceptual integration of a given presentation space and a new 
reference space results in a concrete meaning. Just as  there would be no legend without 
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Mr. X and no saint without the Sprachgebärde of virtue and wonder, there would be no 
Renaissance without Dürer's painting and the Pathosformel reinforced by it. The 
process that we described is the way it makes sense, both for the author or painter and 
for us, who just receive the message for understanding. 
In both cases I suggested that Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel are prior to the case 
or to its concrete experience. The same must be true for schemas and scripts that we 
identified as a first cognitive concept relevant for those  terms. This allows me to ask 
now where Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel may come from. If they are prior to the 
case and to the concrete experience, where might they come from, where might they be 
at home? Are they universals or archetypes (as often suggested) that exist as an apriori 
transcendent category? From the point of view of rhetoric, Joachim Knape has 
discussed the meaning of Pathosformel and rejected clearly any significance in the use 
of the term based on the idea of an universal set of signs or archetypes (Knape, 123, 
129). For Warburg Pathosformel seems to be less a rhetoric sign (Knape, 131) than a 
vestige within what Knape calls the code of the European community of  visual 
communication (der europäischen Bildkommunikationsgemeinschaft; Knape, 135). 
What does that mean? Might this help explain why certain Pathosformel could have 
been lost somehow in the Middle Ages – as Warburg suggests? Or how could they 
come to an end – as Jolles states for the legend of saints (though he recognizes that they 
found their "renaissance" in the sports pages of today’s newspapers?  
I would like to propose an answer in two steps. First I would like to refer to what 
Leonard Talmy called the "Cognitive Culture System" that evolved in the human 
species as "an innately determined brain system whose principal function is the 
acquisition, exercise, and imparting of culture" (Talmy II, 373). Talmy provides 
evidence for his thesis that "culture is a highly organized cognitive construction, and 
that little in cognition of such a complex and systematic character 'just happens' without 
specific neural provision for it". This cognitive culture system is acquired in infancy, 
then turns out to be quite stable through lifelong exercise and is continuously handed 
down to the following generation. As we attempt to establish congruency between our 
conception of the world and the world we live in, incongruities between the 
environment and the developed brain, incongruities introduced, for example, by 
significant changes in the environment, produce distress and dysfunction (Wexler, 
1772). Through our cognitive culture system we stick to "certain kinds of regularities, 
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patterns, and norms" (Talmy 379) by which we experience the world and develop 
meaning.  
Talmy refers to the famous list of 72 cultural universals proposed by George Peter 
Murdock in 1965 as the general framework through which culture emerges. Among the 
72 universals we find cosmology and courtship as well as hair-styles and hospitality or 
sexual restrictions and soul concepts, just to give six examples in their original 
alphabetical context (Talmy 376). But we do not find Sprachgebärde or Pathosformel, 
because they are not universal in the sense of Murdock's list. But nevertheless they are 
part of the cognitive culture system developed along our history in its concrete 
"regularities, patterns, and norms". As such they are a cognitive entity, prior to the 
concrete experience, but dependent on its acquisition, exercise and imparting. This 
might explain how the Pathosformel could have gone lost and be rediscovered again, 
why Sprachgebärden can die and then rise again. Certain "means of transmission"
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guarantee their survival – though they might be "concealed" by other artefacts or 
cultural strata as Warburg explains in his introduction to the Mnemosyne-Atlas 
(Warburg, "Mnemosyne" 5). It mainly explains why we can share the notion of 
Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel and why they can work meaningfully as schemas and 
in conceptual integration, not as a genetic heritage but as a cultural experience 
renewable through continuous acquisition. The cognitive culture system is universal as 
a human condition, but it is necessarily historical in its actuality. Or in the famous 
words of simple truth: We are cultural by nature. That is why Dieter Wuttke's 
suggestion that culture studies (he speaks of Geisteswissenschaft) should be the science 
of the historical world is a necessary reorientation in an artificially divided culture 
(Wuttke, Para uma visão holística, 58). And thus cognitive studies as a reductive neuro- 
and brain science could never achieve an adequate insight about the historical process of 
mind and meaning. 
I would like to invite you to consider a second cognitive model that might help us 
describe the challenge even more clearly. Figure 3 presents a simplified summary of the 
"Architecture of Semantic Domains", developed by Per Aage Brandt.  
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4 =  speech-act
5 = polis (work)
6 = oikos (love)




11 = descriptive discourse
12 = argumentative discourse
13 =  narrative discourse
14 = science knowledge
15 = philosophy knowledge
16 = history knowledge
theatre
The Architecture of Semantic Domains
Based on: Per Aage Brandt, Spaces, Domains and Meaning. 
Essays in Cognitive Semiotics. Bern etc.: Lang 2004.
Figure 3
 
In the centre of the diagram you find the four basic semantic domains (the physical, 
social, mental and speech-act domains), surrounded by twelve satellite domains. In a 
first orbit we find the practical domains (work, love and worship). A second orbit based 
on exchange establishes economy (exchanging things), jurisdiction (exchanging acts) 
and aesthetics (exchanging signs). As a third orbit we find the discourses of description, 
argumentation and narration that establish finally three domains of knowledge in 
science, philosophy, and history.  
I will not discuss this architecture now – and I even do not want do suggest it as the 
final word on the structure of our semantic domains. I would like to use this structure 
just for the purpose of clarifying where Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde are – 
metaphorically speaking – at home. Here we come to some interesting findings. First we 
recognize that Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde seem to be at home in the so-called 
domain of aesthetics since they are mainly determined by the exchange of signs. In the 
case of Sprachgebärde we recognize its deep foundation in the speech-act domain, 
while the Pathosformel seems to be outreaching to the narrative discourse.  
Anyway, what is most striking about such observation is the fact that it does not fully 
satisfy a characterization of what Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde are about. And this 
second finding can help us understand why the cognitive description of their meaning is 
a complex endeavour: the interesting point in Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde is not 
where they are at home and what they mean in terms of semantic determination. On the 
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contrary, Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel are ways of connecting domains of meaning 
and thus ways by which meaning is performed. Instead of situating Sprachgebärde and 
Pathosformel in an "Architecture of Semantic Domains", we should try to describe 
ways and forms of interacting and performing semantic structures. Or expressing this 
finding even more radically: Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel do not mean anything; 
they are just ways of performing meaning. It is their performative character that 
Warburg emphasizes in the task of representing "menschlich bewegtes Leben", humanly 
moved life, as he explains in the introduction to the Mnemosyne project (Warburg, 
“Mnemosyne”, 6). The representation of humanly moved life leads Warburg necessarily 




I would like to draw two conclusions from this observation. The first is that we might 
need to develop a new kind of cognitive architecture not searching for meaning and 
semantic determination, but trying to describe cognitive forms of interacting and 
performing semantic domains. Instead of observing what one thinks, the question would 
be how one thinks. Not insisting on the content of meaning but on the ways and forms 
of its appearance. In the same way that Murdock's list cannot account for 
Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel, an "Architecture of Semantic Domains" does not 
provide the essential elements to describe them. Again: we already know a lot about the 
content of an "Architecture of Semantic Domains" and about the content of a culture 
cognitive system as described by Talmy. Murdock's list would be a kind of general 
lexicon of the culture cognitive system, varied by each culture in concrete forms. But 
we know very little about a general grammar of this system that determines the way in 
which the lexicon is performed. Ways of thinking – instead of contents of meaning, that 
is what Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel are about. 
Using the metaphors of lexicon and grammar reveals how much of what 
Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel adhere to depends on cultural variety. As the lexicon, 
grammar is culturally determined. Thus the second point to conclude from this 
observation is that Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel belong to what we started to 
describe in recent projects developed in our research centre as tacit knowledge 
(Hanenberg). Tacit knowledge is a term that we borrowed from Michael Polanyi and his 
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 As Knape (Knape 124) pointed out, inviting to a critical evaluation of Warburg's attempt. 
9 
 
famous thesis that "we know more than we can tell". Even though our research on tacit 
knowledge has only started and therefore has given rise to more questions than to any 
answers and still less to any certainty, we might agree beforehand that there is some 
tacit dimension in the way we think and that this tacit dimension is culturally imparted 
and shared. A Pathosformel would be a tacit way of representing humanly moved life, 
as Sprachgebärde would be a tacit kind of expression both being culturally determined. 
In tacit knowledge cognitive principles meet history as their cultural concretization. We 
do not have any cognitive principles without their cultural concretization and no cultural 
processes that are not based on the cognitive principles. In tacit knowledge nature and 
nurture meet necessarily.  
I imagine Warburg's library as the archive of tacit knowledge, and if it were able to 
speak, we would certainly know more about the way we think. If one could identify the 
coordinates in Warburg's Mnemosyne Atlas we would get a veritable map to tacit 
knowledge that would not only identify semantic domains but mainly the way they are 
linked together. A cognitive science seeking for the conditions and the performance of 
tacit knowledge will find in Warburg's and Jolles' work an identical interest: to find out 
not what, but how we think, view and speak, describing ways of blending, identifying 
scripts and schemas, naming patterns, rules and norms and recognizing the dynamic 
relation in the way they perform across semantic domains by building up cognitive 
culture systems smaller than mankind but embracing more than the individual.  
The project would actually be a science of culture. And even before we can start to 
explore it further, we recognize immediately that this tacit knowledge is as powerful
5
 as 
it is fragile. As tacit knowledge, Pathosformeln and Sprachgebärden must be acquired, 
must be practiced and imparted. That is what culture is about. That is why we care about 
the art of viewing and the art of reading. At risk always. Lost and refound. That is why 
Mnemosyne is as much the goddess of the past as the guide to the future.  
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 Karl Sierek has given a systematic approach to iconic energy that seems to cover quite well the function 
of Pathosformal as tacit knowledge, mainly in what he calls the "orientational functions of the image". 
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